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The purpose of this article is to set out a comprehensive model provision 
for the crime of rape (or the equivalent offence) that can be incorporated 
into all Australian criminal jurisdictions irrespective of whether the 
particular legislation can be broadly categorised as being a code or a 
statute. This is in part achieved by defining the specified fault elements, 
such as knowledge and recklessness, within the provision, thereby 
overcoming the lack of such definitions in the entire code or statute in some 
jurisdictions. Given that only the Australian Capital Territory and the 
Northern Territory have adopted Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code 1995 
(Cth), which contains all the general principles of criminal responsibility 
that apply to any offence, uniform criminal law reform in Australia has 
stalled. One objective of this article is to show that it is possible to reform 
key criminal offences in a uniform manner. Apart from addressing the 
current inconsistencies in rape provisions in Australia, the proposed model 
provision is also designed to clarify the vexed question of whether the 
defendant reasonably believed the victim was consenting. In this way, it is 
hoped that some of the well-known difficulties in securing a conviction for 
rape — where it is often one person’s word versus another’s against a 
standard of proof of beyond reasonable doubt — may be reduced through 
the comprehensiveness and clarity of the statutory language employed in 
the model provision. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The burden of proof required to prove rape in a criminal court can never be 
satisfied; if we are to abandon the formulation used in many jurisdictions, 
that the defendant who reasonably believed that the victim consented is 
innocent, and rely instead upon the victim’s statement that she did not 
consent as sufficient, then we will have to lighten the tariff. We will have 
to reduce the penalties for rape.1 
                                                        
  Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Southern Queensland. The author would like to 
thank the anonymous referees for their helpful comments. 
1  Germaine Greer, On Rape (Melbourne University Press, 2018) 27–8. The low rape 
prosecution rate has been illustrated by recent figures released for the Australian Capital 
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This article seeks to identify a model provision for rape (or the equivalent 
offence) judged against (1) the twin criteria of clarity and 
comprehensiveness; (2) the need to accommodate the different architecture 
of criminal provisions in Australia; and (3) the requirement to incorporate 
the fault elements, and the treatment of mistake of fact and intoxication in 
the model provision. As will be seen, Australian jurisdictions differ widely 
in terms of the twin criteria of clarity and comprehensiveness, from 
Victoria and South Australia which can be classified as ‘comprehensive’, 
to Queensland and Western Australia which adopt minimalist statutory 
language. It will be argued that the differences in the framework and 
statutory construction between the three broad criminal regimes in 
Australia2 can be overcome in the treatment of rape by specifically 
restricting the meaning of the fault elements and the operation of the 
‘defences’ of mistake of fact and intoxication to the relevant Division of 
the respective Crimes Act or Criminal Code. 
The use of comprehensive statutory language has been criticised as 
potentially leading to greater difficulties in judicial interpretation with a 
resultant loss of clarity, and lengthy statutory prescription means that the 
legislation is less adaptable to emerging situations not anticipated by the 
legislature. For example, Fisse has highlighted the disparity between the 
theory that a criminal code should be internally self-consistent and self-
sufficient with the practical reality that ‘inevitable ambiguities of language 
make this impossible’.3 An alternative way of considering this question is 
to examine whether it is beyond the capacity of any Australian legislature 
in the 21st century to clearly state its intentions in a manner that is sufficient 
for the ordinary citizen to fully comprehend his or her criminal liability. 
Simester, Spencer, Sullivan and Virgo, writing of the situation in the 
United Kingdom, put their finger on the heart of the challenge: 
A degree of imprecision is inherent in the enterprise of legal ordering: 
statutes are necessarily expressed in general terms, and must be interpreted 
and applied to particular cases. The agent of this process is the court. In 
practice, the judicial task is more substantial than it need be. While 
legislators cannot be expected to foresee every variant case that might arise 
                                                        
Territory for the six month period between September 2018 and February 2019, where 
just 4 rape charges proceeded from 75 reports (5%), and for the cases that came to court 
in the same period approximately half resulted in convictions. See Clare Sibthorpe, 
‘Canberra’s low rape prosecution rate shows ‘monumental failure’ of justice system, 
services say’ ABC News (online, 21 March 2019) <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-
03-21/5-per-cent-of-rape-reports-to-act-police-progress-to-
charges/10903578?WT.ac=statenews_act>. 
2  The Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory have adopted Chapter 2 of 
the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth); Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia can be 
grouped as Griffith Codes; and New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia can be 
grouped together under the rubric of statutorily following the ‘common law’.  
3  Brent Fisse, Criminal Law (The Law Book Company Limited, 5th ed, 1990) 4. 
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when they create an offence, the standard of draftsmanship in this country 
is such that offences frequently omit to specify quite obvious matters …4 
Given the severe penalties that apply following a conviction for rape, this 
article proceeds on the basis that the standard of statutory language in 
Australia for this offence can be uniformly improved such that an ordinary 
person better understands his or her exposure to criminal liability in an area 
of the criminal law that is all too frequently before the courts. 
For the offence of rape (sexual intercourse without consent) this article 
specifically addresses three questions: (1) the consistency of the vitiating 
factors for consent; (2) the consistency of the fault elements, particularly 
the scope of the definition of recklessness or reckless indifference; and (3) 
the consistency of the ‘defences’ of mistake of fact and intoxication. The 
overall purpose is twofold: (1) to make the test for mistaken belief in 
consent more objective; and (2) to make the process of adjudging guilt for 
rape more objective.5 
II THE CONSISTENCY OF THE VITIATING FACTORS FOR CONSENT 
Rape is sexual intercourse or sexual penetration without consent.6 A 
comprehensive definition of ‘sexual penetration’ can be found in s 35A of 
the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic),7 and ‘to sexually penetrate’ is defined in s 319 
of the Criminal Code (WA).8 Queensland uses the expression ‘carnal 
knowledge’ which is defined in s 6 of the Criminal Code (Qld).9  
                                                        
4  AP Simester et al, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine (Hart, 
4th ed, 2010) 45. Examples given include failure to specify the burden of proof or even 
the mens rea requirement in an offence. 
5  More generally, see Andrew Hemming, ‘Reasserting the Place of Objective Tests in 
Criminal Responsibility: Ending the Supremacy of Subjective Tests’ (2011) 13 The 
University of Notre Dame Australia Law Review 69. 
6  Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania and Victoria use the term ‘rape’ in their criminal 
legislation. The Australia Capital Territory and Northern Territory refer to ‘sexual 
intercourse without consent’ and Western Australia to ‘sexual penetration without 
consent’. New South Wales uses the term ‘sexual assault’ to refer to a sexual offence 
involving penetration. 
7  Section 35A(1) states that: A person (A) sexually penetrates another person (B) if — (a) 
A introduces (to any extent) a part of A's body or an object into B's vagina; or (b) A 
introduces (to any extent) a part of A's body or an object into B's anus; or (c) A introduces 
(to any extent) their penis into B's mouth; or (d) A, having introduced a part of A's body 
or an object into B's vagina, continues to keep it there; or (e) A, having introduced a part 
of A's body or an object into B's anus, continues to keep it there; or (f) A, having 
introduced their penis into B's mouth, continues to keep it there.  
8  To sexually penetrate means — (a) to penetrate the vagina (which term includes 
the labia majora), the anus, or the urethra of any person with — (i) any part of the body 
of another person; or (ii) an object manipulated by another person, except where the 
penetration is carried out for proper medical purposes; or (b) to manipulate any part of 
the body of another person so as to cause penetration of the vagina (which term includes 
the labia majora), the anus, or the urethra of the offender by part of the other person’s 
body; or (c) to introduce any part of the penis of a person into the mouth of another 
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Across9 the criminal law jurisdictions of Australia there is a broad 
consensus that, for the purpose of sexual offences, ‘consent’ means ‘free 
and voluntary agreement’.10 Only the Australian Capital Territory under s 
67 of the Crimes Act 1900 which is entitled ‘Consent’ fails to define 
consent, presumably treating the meaning of consent as generally 
understood in the community, and relying instead on the circumstances 
whereby consent is negated. In the United Kingdom, the equivalent 
language is to be found in s 74 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which 
states: ‘For the purposes of this Part, a person consents if he agrees by 
choice, and has the freedom and capacity to make that choice.’ 
The circumstances in which a person does not consent to sexual intercourse 
as set out in Australian criminal law jurisdictions are broadly similar, but 
there are some significant variations which require attention. Given the 
common thread that runs through the lists of these circumstances negating 
consent, it is unfortunate that such variations exist but are easily 
remediable. The position taken in this article is that the more exhaustive 
and comprehensive the list of circumstances the greater the clarity, 
especially if the list is buttressed by examples, such as the one used in s 
46(3)(h) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) discussed 
below. 
There is a misconception, particularly amongst lawyers wedded to the 
purported advantages of the organic development of the common law, that 
there is a tension between comprehensiveness and clarity on the one hand 
versus the risk of inflexibility on the other hand. The argument runs that 
seeking comprehensiveness overlooks the unforeseen circumstances that 
may arise in the future which the drafters of the legislation may not have 
envisaged. Such an argument is challenged in this article on the basis that 
the legislative starting point is a search for comprehensiveness. While the 
model provision in this paper does allow for a degree of judicial discretion 
to be exercised in genuinely unforeseen circumstances, it is beholden on 
the legislature following such a decision to amend the legislation 
accordingly so that it remains comprehensive and up to date. Thus, 
‘comprehensive’ does not mean ‘exhaustive’ in the sense of being ossified, 
moribund, fossilised or frozen in time, but the meaning of ‘comprehensive’ 
also encompasses parliament’s endorsement, amendment or rejection of 
the ‘temporary’ circumstance of vitiation of consent that emerged from the 
case law. In effect, this is no more than a statement acknowledging the 
                                                        
person; or (d) to engage in cunnilingus or fellatio; or (e) to continue sexual penetration 
as defined in paragraph (a), (b), (c) or (d). 
9 Section 6 states: (1) If ‘carnal knowledge’ is used in defining an offence, the offence, so 
far as regards that element of it, is complete on penetration to any extent. (2) ‘Carnal 
knowledge’ includes anal intercourse. 
 
10 Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) s 268.14(3); Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 61HE(2); Criminal 
Code (NT) s 192(1); Criminal Code (Qld) s 348(1); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 
1935 (SA) s 46(2); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 36(2); Criminal Code (Tas) s 2A(1); 
Criminal Code Act Compilation Act (WA) s 319(2)(a). 
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supremacy of parliament and the need to draft legislation minimising 
judicial discretion so that citizens know where they stand in relation to 
criminal responsibility. 
Examination of the relevant sections dealing with the factors that vitiate 
consent reveals that s 36(2) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) contains the most 
comprehensive list.11 However, note that the sub-section specifically states 
that the list is not closed. 
(2) Circumstances in which a person does not consent to an act include, 
but are not limited to, the following —  
(a) the person submits to the act because of force or the fear of 
force, whether to that person or someone else;  
(b) the person submits to the act because of the fear of harm of any 
type, whether to that person or someone else or an animal;  
(c) the person submits to the act because the person is unlawfully 
detained;  
(d)  the person is asleep or unconscious;  
(e)  the person is so affected by alcohol or another drug as to be 
incapable of consenting to the act;  
(f)  the person is so affected by alcohol or another drug as to be 
incapable of withdrawing consent to the act; 
Note: This circumstance may apply where a person gave 
consent when not so affected by alcohol or another 
drug as to be incapable of consenting. 
(g)  the person is incapable of understanding the sexual nature of the 
act;  
(h)  the person is mistaken about the sexual nature of the act;  
(i)  the person is mistaken about the identity of any other person 
involved in the act;  
(j)  the person mistakenly believes that the act is for medical or 
hygienic purposes;  
                                                        
11  This list is complemented by s 46 Direction on Consent of the Jury Directions Act 2015 
(Vic). Under s 46(1) and (2), the prosecution or defence counsel may request that the 
trial judge direct the jury on the meaning of consent or on the circumstances in which a 
person is taken not to have consented to an act. As to the direction on the meaning of 
consent, under s 46(3) one or more of five directions may be given by the trial judge, 
such as the direction in s 46(3)(b): ‘inform the jury that where a person has given consent 
to an act, the person may withdraw that consent either before the act takes place or at 
any time while the act is taking place.’ 
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(k)  if the act involves an animal, the person mistakenly believes that 
the act is for veterinary, agricultural or scientific research 
purposes;  
(l)  the person does not say or do anything to indicate consent to the 
act;  
(m) having initially given consent to the act, the person later 
withdraws consent to the act taking place or continuing.  
The above list has been designed to take account of previous cases, such as 
s 36(2)(j) which has statutorily reversed R v Mobilio12 by providing that a 
person does not freely agree if they mistakenly believe that the act is for 
medical or hygienic purposes. South Australia usefully provides an 
example in the equivalent section to s 36(2)(j) above, namely, s 46(3)(h) of 
the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA): 
(h)  the person is mistaken about the nature of the activity.  
Example —  
A person is taken not to freely and voluntarily agree to sexual activity if the 
person agrees to engage in the activity under the mistaken belief that the 
activity is necessary for the purpose of medical diagnosis, investigation or 
treatment, or for the purpose of hygiene.  
The above example could be inserted under s 36(2)(j) of the Crimes Act 
1958 (Vic), which would helpfully explain how the sub-section is intended 
to operate. Similarly, the circumstance set out above in s 36(2)(l), which 
states ‘the person does not say or do anything to indicate consent to the 
act’, could be supplemented by the example given in s 46(3)(d) of the Jury 
Directions Act 2015 (Vic), namely, ‘the person may freeze and not do or 
say anything’. 
The breadth of s 36(2) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) can be seen in sub-
section (b) which covers the fear of harm of any type, thereby including 
non-physical threats, sub-section (i) where mistaken identity covers ‘any 
other person involved in the act’, and sub-section (l) ‘the person does not 
say or do anything to indicate consent to the act’, which requires positive 
communication by treating implied consent as not being ‘free and 
voluntary agreement’ because consent has to be express consent, albeit by 
word (‘say’) or deed (‘do’). 
Section 36(2)(m) reflects the ‘continuing act’ doctrine. In the event that 
consent is initially given by the complainant to sexual penetration but is 
later withdrawn, then under the ‘continuing act’ doctrine, the offence of 
                                                        
12   [1991] 1 VR 339. In R v Mobilio the fraud caused the victim to believe that penetration 
(by a medical instrument) was being undertaken for medical diagnostic purposes, 
whereas the procedure was unnecessary and engaged upon solely for the sexual 
gratification of the operator. 
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rape or sexual penetration without consent is committed: see R v 
Mayberry.13 Another relevant case to the same effect is Kaitamaki v The 
Queen,14 where the Privy Council held that the actus reus of rape was a 
continuing act, and that when the appellant realised consent was withdrawn 
and he therefore formed the mens rea, the necessary coincidence for 
criminal responsibility crystallised. Section 36(2)(m) could usefully 
contain an example of the operation of the ‘continuing act’ doctrine, by 
drawing on the direction by the trial judge under s 46(3)(b) of the Jury 
Directions Act 2015 (Vic), namely, ‘inform the jury that where a person 
has given consent to an act, the person may withdraw that consent either 
before the act takes place or at any time while the act is taking place’. 
The least exhaustive list is presently to be found in s 319(2)(a) of the 
Criminal Code (WA) where ‘consent is not freely and voluntarily given if 
it is obtained by force, threat, intimidation, deceit, or any fraudulent 
means’. The broad phrase ‘deceit, or any fraudulent means’15 was the 
subject of critical judicial comment in Michael v State of Western 
Australia.16 In this case, the appellant deceived two sex workers who were 
also drug addicts into believing he was a police officer. The appellant 
threatened both sex workers that he would make trouble for them if they 
did not agree to provide their services at a reduced rate (in the case of one 
sex worker) and for free (for the other). Both women gave evidence to the 
effect that they only consented to the ‘discount’ because of their belief the 
appellant was a police officer and the vulnerability of their profession. 
Steytler P dismissed the appeal because the impersonation of the police 
officer facilitated the threat to make trouble, and therefore it was 
unnecessary to decide the scope of deceit or fraud for the purpose of 
vitiating consent. Steytler P suggested that the most appropriate solution 
was for the legislature to amend the legislation as ‘the use of the words 
“deceit or any fraudulent means” renders the section susceptible to an 
interpretation that is dramatic in its reach’.17 EM Heenan AJA (dissenting) 
took the view that ‘s 319(2) must be limited to avoid ‘indiscriminate 
applications’ of the section to ‘antecedent matters, such as representations 
                                                        
13  [1973] Qd R 211, 229 (Hanger J). 
14  [1985] 1 AC 147. 
15  Western Australia is not alone in Australia in having a very broad approach to the 
treatment of fraud as a vitiating factor for consent. Section 2A(f) of the Criminal Code 
(Tas) states as a circumstance where a person does not freely agree to an act if the person 
‘agrees or submits because of the fraud of the accused’. Similarly, s 67(1)(g) of the 
Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) states consent is negated ‘by a fraudulent misrepresentation of 
any fact made by the other person, or by a third person to the knowledge of the other 
person’. 
16  [2008] WASCA 66. 
17  Ibid [89]. 
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about payment when dealing with prostitutes, or fraudulent blandishments 
intended to make a person more attractive, such as the wiles of a seducer.’18 
Thus, the main judicial concern in Michael v State of Western Australia19 
was for the legislature to clarify the reach of s 319(2)(a) as it related to 
vitiation of consent for ‘deceit, or any fraudulent means’. The obvious 
danger with such a broad definition is that it could potentially encompass 
broken promises that the community would not consider vitiated consent 
to sexual intercourse, such as promising to buy a horse or jewellery in 
exchange for sexual intercourse.20 Indeed, EM Heenan AJA notes that 
there are numerous deceptions or concealments that may surround sexual 
intercourse, such as marital status or ‘exaggerated protestations of wealth’. 
21 His Honour notes that while such may be ‘deplorable’, it is not ‘so 
criminal as to justify a conviction for the most serious form of sexual 
offence’.22 Thus, it would be ‘surprising indeed if, by such an indirect 
means, as the amendment to s 319(2) of the Criminal Code, Parliament had 
intended to effect such a far-reaching change to the law’.23 
The solution appears to lie in the Western Australian Parliament more 
clearly specifying the nature of the deceit or fraud. EM Heenan AJA 
considered ‘that the scope of deceit or any fraudulent means in s 319(2) 
should be treated as referring to those frauds or misrepresentations which 
deprived the person concerned of a full comprehension of the nature and 
purpose of the proposed activity or his or her legal status of the person as 
a spouse, or his or her identity as an acceptable sexual partner’.24 This 
solution is implied in s 36(2) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) by virtue of the 
lack of a general fraud provision such ‘deceit, or any fraudulent means’, 
                                                        
18  Ibid [384]. 
19  [2008] WASCA 66. 
20  See R v Winchester [2011] QCA 374, [84]–[85] (Muir JA). 
21  Michael v State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 66, [373]. 
22  Ibid.  
23  Ibid.  
24  Ibid [376]. EM Heenan AJA adopted the narrow view of fraudulent behaviour vitiating 
consent favoured by George Syrota and Neil Morgan, as opposed to the wide view that 
any fraudulent behaviour which induces a person to have sexual intercourse will vitiate 
consent, favoured by Simon Bronitt. See George Syrota, ‘Rape: When Does Fraud 
Vitiate Consent’ (1995) 25 University of Western Australia Law Review 334; Neil 
Morgan, ‘Oppression, Fraud and Consent in Sexual Offences’ (1996) 26 University of 
Western Australia Law Review 223; Simon Bronitt, ‘Rape and Consent’ (1992) 16 
Criminal Law Journal 289. For more recent support for the narrow view, see Jonathan 
Rogers, ‘The effect of “deception” in the Sexual Offences Act 2003’ (2013) 4 Archbold 
Review 7. For more recent support for the wide view, see Andrew Dyer, ‘Final 
Submission to the NSW Law Reform Commission’s Review of Consent and Knowledge 
of Consent in Relation to Sexual Assault Offences’, Final Submission to the New South 
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and the inclusion of specific references to mistaken identity in s 36(2)(i) 
and mistake as to the nature of the act in s 36(2)(g) and (h). However, the 
better solution for the purposes of clarity in the model provision would be 
to specifically define frauds or misrepresentations, as a vitiating 
circumstance to consent, as being confined to a full comprehension of the 
nature and purpose of the act25 and the identity of the person.26 
It may be objected that such a definition is overly narrow and reflects the 
common law notion of fraud developed at a time when rape could only be 
perpetrated ‘against the will’ of a person, as opposed to the modern 
definition of consent in terms of free and voluntary agreement. This view 
overlooks the need to confine the word ‘fraud’ to exclude deceptions that 
would fall under a ‘common sense’ list (such as lying about one’s marital 
status or wealth) discussed below. If the broad definition of fraud is 
retained without being confined to a full comprehension of the nature and 
purpose of the act and the identity of the person, then the concerns raised 
by the Western Australian Court of Appeal in Michael v State of Western 
Australia27 (discussed previously) would not be addressed. Parliament (not 
the judiciary) is the appropriate body to either add to the ‘common sense’ 
list of exclusions, or to define ‘fraud’ in the context of rape in a wider 
manner.  
Parliament may, in addition, insert separate sections to address deceit. 
Thus, if a person’s consent was conditional on the other person wearing a 
condom28 or withdrawing his penis before ejaculating to avoid becoming 
pregnant,29 acts colloquially referred to as ‘stealthing’, then it would be 
better to have separate sections vitiating consent that cover such 
eventualities (as in sub-section (p) of the model provision in Part IV) than 
attempt to lump all manner of possibilities under an unconfined generic 
                                                        
25  This is consistent with the Court of Appeal’s decision in R v Jheeta [2007] EWCA Crim 
1699 that the victim had to be deceived as to the nature and purpose of the sexual act 
itself (a comparatively rare case), and not merely deceived as to extraneous 
circumstances. 
26  Rebecca Williams refers to this test as the non est factum test, on the analogy of the test 
for the invalidity of deeds: Rebecca Williams, ‘Deception, mistake and vitiation of the 
victim’s consent’ [2008] Law Quarterly Review 131. 
27  [2008] WASCA 66. 
28  Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2011] EWHC 2849. See also R v Hutchinson 
2014 SCC 19, where the appellant had sabotaged the condom by poking holes in the 
condom and the complainant became pregnant against her express wishes. The 
conviction was upheld on the basis that condom protection was an ‘essential feature’ of 
the sexual activity, and therefore the complainant did not consent to the ‘sexual activity 
in question’. Essentially, the Supreme Court of Canada preferred the view that there was 
no voluntary agreement by the complainant to engage in the ‘sexual activity in question’, 
rather than taking the view that the condom sabotage constituted fraud with the result 
that no consent was obtained. 
29  R(F) v DPP [2014] QB 581. 
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word as ‘fraud’ or ‘misrepresentation’, which is potentially an overreach 
of criminal responsibility. 
In coming to this conclusion on the definition of frauds or 
misrepresentation, the author respectfully disagrees with Professor 
Jonathan Crowe who has argued that avoiding the problem of vagueness 
regarding the relevance of fraud to consent in rape law ‘through legislative 
drafting alone is simply not possible’.30 Vagueness can be minimised by 
the use of examples and the inclusion of a note specifying the types of 
frauds that are excluded. It is an abrogation of Parliament’s responsibility 
not to clearly inform citizens what types of activity entail criminal 
responsibility, especially in the area of sexual relationships, by falling back 
on the rubric of provisions striking a balance ‘between certainty on the one 
hand, and flexibility on the other’ and the inevitability of ‘[a] certain degree 
of imprecision in the statutory rules’.31 
As with ‘stealthing’, the issue of criminal penalties for a person who 
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly transmits a serious disease may be 
better dealt with in a separate criminal provision, rather than include 
withholding relevant medical information from the complainant as a 
vitiating factor for consent.32 Again, there is a balance to be struck between 
protecting victims of deception and having a broad definition of fraud 
whose reach potentially extends criminal responsibility too far. Under a 
separate criminal provision that deals with an intentional transmission of a 
serious sexual disease, the court’s focus will properly be on the mental 
                                                        
30  Jonathan Crowe, ‘Fraud and Consent in Australian Rape Law’ (2014) 38 Criminal Law 
Journal 236, 246. 
31  Ibid 247. 
32  See, eg, s 317 Criminal Code (Qld) on ‘Acts intended to cause grievous bodily harm and 
other malicious acts’. In B [2006] EWCA Crim 2945, the Court of Appeal concluded 
that concealment of HIV was not fraud as to purpose in sex cases. If the defendant says 
nothing and infects the victim, he or she may be guilty of grievous bodily harm but not 
rape. On the distinction between non-disclosure and fraud (lying about your HIV status) 
and the implications of being charged with a non-fatal offence against the person or a 
sexual offence, see Karl Laird, ‘Rapist or Rogue? Deception, Consent and the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003’ [2014] Criminal Law Review 491. See also JR Spencer, ‘Sex by 
Deception’ (2013) 9 Archbold Review 6, who argues that a general offence of obtaining 
sexual activity by threats is needed, as well as an offence of obtaining sexual activity by 
false pretences. However, in R v Cuerrier [1998] 2 SCR 371 and R v Mabior 2012 SCC 
47 the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that knowingly exposing a sexual partner 
to HIV constitutes aggravated sexual assault. Failure to disclose (the dishonest act) 
amounts to fraud where the complainant would not have consented had he or she known 
the accused was HIV-positive, and where sexual contact poses a significant risk or 
causes actual serious bodily harm (deprivation). For a contrary view as to the decision 
in R v Mabior, see Samantha Ryan, ‘“Active Deception” v Non-Disclosure: HIV 
Transmission, Non-Fatal Offences and Criminal Responsibility’ [2019] 1 Criminal Law 
Review 1, 12, who takes the view that non-disclosure, as opposed to deception, ‘does not 
necessarily prevent a sexual partner from making an informed choice’. For a fuller 
discussion of HIV transmission and transgender sexual relations, see Jack Vidler, 
‘Ostensible Consent and the Limits of Sexual Autonomy’ (2017) 17 Macquarie Law 
Journal 103. 
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element and not on whether the transmission constituted fraud as a vitiating 
factor for consent.33 
The solution in the United Kingdom has been to distinguish between 
‘active’ and ‘passive’ deceptions or the act/omission distinction as found 
in s 76(2)(a) of the of the Sexual Offences Act 2003: ‘(a) the defendant 
intentionally deceived the complainant as to the nature or purpose of the 
relevant act, and (b) the defendant intentionally induced the complainant 
to consent to the relevant act by impersonating a person known personally 
to the complainant.’ The distinction between active deception and non-
disclosure of information has been criticised as providing an inadequate 
basis for setting the parameters of criminal liability, being insufficiently 
clear-cut to avoid analytical collapse and criminal liability overreach.34 
This view would appear to be sound, as not all ‘active’ deceptions have 
been found to vitiate consent. In R v McNally,35 Leveson LJ held that lying 
about one’s financial status fell outside the ambit of vitiation of consent in 
taking a ‘common sense’ approach.36 
The conclusion to be drawn as to the definition of consent is that it would 
be a relatively straightforward matter to standardise the list of factors which 
vitiate consent for sexual offences across Australian criminal law 
jurisdictions. There is no apparent reason why the various criminal 
jurisdictions in Australia could not agree on a list of vitiating factors for 
consent in a section dealing with such an important offence as rape. Such 
a list in no way impacts on the architecture or design of the various criminal 
law statutes in Australia. 
The benchmark is that the list needs to be as comprehensive (all-
encompassing) as possible, including the use of examples, without leaving 
                                                        
33  In R v Reid [2006] QCA 202, the section under consideration was s 317(b) of the 
Criminal Code (Qld), and the appeal focused on the meaning of ‘intent’. The appellant 
argued there was no evidence of malice towards the complainant. The Court of Appeal 
inferred the necessary intent from: (1) the appellant’s taunting of the complainant; and 
(2) the appellant’s failure to inform the complainant of steps that would have reduced 
the possibility of HIV infection. 
34  See, for example, Alex Sharpe, ‘Expanding Liability for Sexual Fraud Through the 
Concept of ‘Active Deception’: A Flawed Approach’ (2016) 80(1) The Journal of 
Criminal Law 28, 44. For a contrary view, see Jonathan Herring, ‘Mistaken Sex’ [2005] 
Criminal Law Review 511, who argues that non-disclosure of information considered 
material to the complainant ought to vitiate consent. In a similar vein , see also Tom 
Dougherty, ‘Sex, Lies and Consent’ (2013) 123(4) Ethics 717, who argues that when the 
liar’s actual profession would be a deal breaker for the victim of the deception, such a 
deception vitiates the victim's sexual consent. 
35  [2013] EWCA Crim 1051, [25]. 
36  This ‘common sense’ list would presumably include a deception involving infidelity, 
wealth, marital status, use of a birth control device (by a woman), intention to marry, 
and intention to pay a prostitute: see DP Bryden, ‘Redefining Rape’ (2000) 3 Buffalo 
Criminal Law Review 317, 470–5, 480–7 where 519 male and female respondents were 
surveyed. Interestingly, lying about having a venereal disease and failing to disclose a 
venereal disease were both considered by respondents to be sufficient to vitiate consent. 
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the statutory language so open as to raise doubt as to the reach of the 
section, such as in s 319(2)(a) of the Criminal Code (WA) where the phrase 
‘deceit, or any fraudulent means’ has caused difficulty. It is suggested that 
the starting point for the design of a comprehensive list of factors which 
vitiate consent for sexual offences is s 36(2) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). 
A proposed model list of vitiating factors with some examples is set out in 
Part IV. It will be seen that the model list is not exhaustive by using the 
phrase ‘but are not limited to’, so as to allow a degree of judicial discretion 
where a circumstance not previously considered by the legislature arises in 
the future. However, it would then be for the legislature to amend the list 
accordingly to keep the list comprehensive and up to date, provided it 
supports the case law. Readers of this article may disagree with the content 
of the model list, but hopefully there will be consensus that such a list 
should apply to all Australian jurisdictions. 
III THE CONSISTENCY OF THE FAULT ELEMENTS FOR RAPE 
This section considers the consistency of the fault element for rape (sexual 
intercourse without consent) across Australian jurisdictions. As such, this 
section is more problematic than the previous section on the consistency of 
the vitiating factors for consent, because three jurisdictions, Queensland, 
Tasmania and Western Australia (the Griffith Codes), do not expressly 
recognise knowledge and recklessness as a fault element for any criminal 
offence.37  
An examination of the fault elements for rape across Australian 
jurisdictions reveals that there are marked differences in approach for the 
necessary mental elements to sheet home criminal responsibility. However, 
knowledge or recklessness are the fault elements for the Model Criminal 
Code as well as in New South Wales, South Australia, the Australian 
Capital Territory and Northern Territory.38 As such, knowledge and 
recklessness provide the base for building consistent fault elements for rape 
in Australia. 
At this point it should be made clear this examination also includes the 
treatment of mistake of fact and intoxication as ‘defences’, even though on 
                                                        
37  The standard formula for offences in the Griffith Codes is not to set out a fault element. 
Instead, the main criminal responsibility provision in Queensland and Western Australia 
(s 23) and Tas (s 13) deals with voluntariness and accident or chance (now the 
‘reasonably foreseeable consequence’ test in Qld). The result is that the sub silentio 
underlying fault element in the Griffith Codes is negligence: see Stephen Edward Taiters 
(1996) 87 A Crim R 507, 512: ‘The Crown is obliged to establish that the accused 
intended that the event in question should occur or foresaw it as a possible outcome, or 
that an ordinary person in the position of the accused would reasonably have foreseen 
the event as a possible outcome’. 
38  Model Criminal Code, cl 5.2.6; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 54; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), 
s 61HE; Criminal Code (NT), s 192(3); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), s 
48. 
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one view such ‘defences’ are not strictly fault elements. One reason for this 
approach is that the Griffith Codes of Queensland, Tasmania and Western 
Australia, by failing to specify a fault element, effectively treat rape as a 
crime of strict liability.39 The wording of these provisions yield the result 
that if sexual intercourse has taken place and consent is the issue, then 
mistake of fact is the only defence to a strict liability offence.40 
A Fault Elements 
The starting point of this examination is to consider those jurisdictions that 
specifically identify knowledge and recklessness as fault elements for rape, 
commencing with s 192 of the Criminal Code (NT) which deals with sexual 
intercourse without consent. For present purposes, the relevant sub-
sections are s 192(3) and s 192(4A), which are based on cl 5.2.6 of the 
Model Criminal Code and has been ignored by the Griffith Code States of 
Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia. 
(3) A person is guilty of an offence if the person has sexual intercourse 
with another person: 
        (a)     without the other person's consent; and 
        (b)     knowing about or being reckless as to the lack of consent. 
Maximum penalty:     Imprisonment for life. 
(4A) For subsection (3) being reckless as to a lack of consent to sexual 
intercourse includes not giving any thought to whether or not the 
other person is consenting to the sexual intercourse.  
The Northern Territory is in the process of adopting Chapter 2 of the 
Criminal Code 1995 (Cth), and the meaning of knowledge and recklessness 
in s 192 follows the definitions of those fault elements in the Criminal Code 
1995 (Cth),41 as set out in s 43AJ and s 43AK in the Criminal Code (NT) 
below. 
43AJ KNOWLEDGE 
A person has knowledge of a result or circumstance if the person is aware 
that it exists or will exist in the ordinary course of events. 
43AK RECKLESSNESS 
                                                        
39  Criminal Code (Qld), s 349; Criminal Code (Tas), s 185; Criminal Code Act 
Compilation Act (WA), s 325. 
40  See, eg, s 349(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code (Qld): (1) Any person who rapes another 
person is guilty of a crime; (2)(a) A person rapes another person if — the person has 
carnal knowledge with or of the other person without the other person’s consent. See 
also s 325(1) of the Criminal Code Act Compilation Act (WA): A person who sexually 
penetrates another person without the consent of that person is guilty of a crime and is 
liable to imprisonment for 14 years. 
41  See s 5.3 Knowledge and s 5.4 Recklessness of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth). 
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(1) A person is reckless in relation to a result if: 
(a) the person is aware of a substantial risk that the result will 
happen; and 
(b) having regard to the circumstances known to the person, it is 
unjustifiable to take the risk. 
(2) A person is reckless in relation to a circumstance if: 
(a) the person is aware of a substantial risk that the circumstance 
exists or will exist; and 
(b) having regard to the circumstances known to the person, it is 
unjustifiable to take the risk.     
Thus, it can be seen that s 192(3) above specifies knowledge and 
recklessness as alternative fault elements. However, s 192(4A) expands the 
definition of recklessness to include ‘not giving any thought to whether or 
not the other person is consenting to the sexual intercourse or act of gross 
indecency’. 
In South Australia, s 48(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 
(SA), which deals with the crime of rape, also specifies knowledge 
(awareness) and recklessness as alternative fault elements. 
48 — Rape  
(1) A person (the "offender") is guilty of the offence of rape if he or she 
engages, or continues to engage, in sexual intercourse with another 
person who —  
(a) does not consent to engaging in the sexual intercourse; or  
(b) has withdrawn consent to the sexual intercourse,  
and the offender knows, or is recklessly indifferent to, the fact that the 
other person does not so consent or has so withdrawn consent (as the 
case may be).  
The phrase ‘recklessly indifferent’ in s 48(1) above is defined in s 47 of the 
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA). 
47 — Reckless indifference  
For the purposes of this Division, a person is "recklessly indifferent to the 
fact that another person does not consent to an act, or has withdrawn 
consent” to an act, if he or she —  
(a) is aware of the possibility that the other person might not be 
consenting to the act, or has withdrawn consent to the act, but decides 
to proceed regardless of that possibility; or  
(b) is aware of the possibility that the other person might not be 
consenting to the act, or has withdrawn consent to the act, but fails 
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to take reasonable steps to ascertain whether the other person does in 
fact consent, or has in fact withdrawn consent, to the act before 
deciding to proceed; or 
(c) does not give any thought as to whether or not the other person is 
consenting to the act, or has withdrawn consent to the act before 
deciding to proceed.  
Section 47 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) specifies 
three alternative ways in which ‘reckless indifference’ is satisfied. Both s 
47(a) and s 47(b) require an awareness of the possibility that the other 
person might not be consenting, either by proceeding regardless of that 
possibility (advertent recklessness) or by failing to take reasonable steps 
(an objective test) to ascertain whether the act is consensual before 
deciding to proceed (culpable inadvertence).42 The third alternative, set out 
in s 47(c), not giving any thought to consent before deciding to proceed, 
mirrors s 192(4A) of the Criminal Code (NT) above. Judged by the 
criterion of comprehensiveness, s 47 of the Criminal Law Consolidation 
Act 1935 (SA), usefully covers the field and provides a model definition of 
the fault element of ‘recklessness’. 
Thus, a baseline position for ascribing criminal responsibility for rape 
(sexual intercourse without consent) would be to specify the alternative 
fault elements of ‘knowledge’ as defined in the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth), 
which is adopted in s 43AJ of the Criminal Code (NT), and recklessness as 
found in the definition of ‘reckless indifference’ contained in s 47 of the 
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA). 
This conclusion invites comparison with the treatment of the fault element 
of rape in other Australian jurisdictions, commencing with New South 
Wales, which also specifies the alternative fault elements of knowledge and 
recklessness in s 61HE(3) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). 
(3) Knowledge about consent 
A person who without the consent of the other person (the ‘alleged victim’) 
engages in a sexual activity with or towards the alleged victim, incites 
the alleged victim to engage in a sexual activity or incites a third person to 
engage in a sexual activity with or towards the alleged victim, knows that 
the alleged victim does not consent to the sexual activity if:  
(a) the person knows that the alleged victim does not consent to the 
sexual activity, or  
(b) the person is reckless as to whether the alleged victim consents to 
the sexual activity, or  
(c) the person has no reasonable grounds for believing that the 
alleged victim consents to the sexual activity.  
                                                        
42  See R v Banditt [2004] NSWCCA 208, [78]–[79] (James J).  
In Search of a Model Provision for Rape in Australia  87 
(4)  For the purpose of making any such finding, the trier of fact must have 
regard to all the circumstances of the case:  
(a) including any steps taken by the person to ascertain whether the 
alleged victim consents to the sexual activity, but  
(b) not including any self-induced intoxication of the person.  
Unlike the Criminal Code (NT), there is no definition of ‘knowledge’ or 
‘recklessness’43 in the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). However, s 61HE(3)(c) 
does specify an additional alternative fault element in the form of no 
reasonable grounds for believing the other person was consenting, which 
has the purpose of negating the ‘defence’ of mistake of fact and will be 
further discussed in the next section.44 Each of the three alternative fault 
elements (knowledge, recklessness, or no reasonable grounds for belief) as 
to consent, is to be determined by all the circumstances of the case 
including any steps taken to ascertain consent, but excluding self-induced 
intoxication. 
As regards s 61HE(4)(a) above, Dyer has argued45 that the NSW 
Parliament should reverse the decision in R v Lazarus46 where Bellew J 
held that a step involves the taking of some positive act, but this does not 
have to be a physical act. A ‘step’ therefore includes a person’s 
consideration of events he or she hears, observes or perceives. Dyer’s 
solution is to insert into s 61HE(4)(a) the words ‘physical or verbal’ 
between ‘any’ and ‘steps’: (a) including any physical or verbal steps taken 
…47 
In the suggested model provision for rape in Part IV, the reasonable steps 
provision is preferred to s 61HE(4)(a), with the addition of Dyer’s solution, 
so that the provision becomes ‘reasonable physical or verbal steps’. While 
the reasonable steps provision may not add a great deal to the question of 
the accused’s mens rea, it does provide a standard against which to measure 
                                                        
43  In New South Wales, there is considerable case law on the meaning of ‘recklessness’: R 
v Hemsley (1988) 36 A Crim R 334; R v Kitchener (1993) 29 NSWLR 696; R v Tolmie 
(1995) 37 NSWLR 660. Essentially, this trio of cases is authority for the meaning of 
recklessness to encompass the situation where the accused considered that the victim 
might not be consenting yet continued regardless, and as such constituted sufficient mens 
rea under the previous equivalent section to s 61HE(3)(b). However, case law is no 
substitute for the legislature distilling a consistent meaning from the cases and inserting 
statutory endorsement into the relevant section. 
44  Section 61HE(3)(c) is essentially a statutory statement of honest and reasonable but 
mistaken belief. See Bank of New South Wales v Piper [1897] AC 383, discussed below 
(n 68). 
45  Andrew Dyer, ‘Sexual Assault Law Reform in New South Wales: Why the Lazarus 
Litigation Demonstrates No Need for s 61HE of the Crimes Act to Be Changed (Except 
in One Minor Respect)’ (2019) 43 Criminal Law Journal 78, 98–9. 
46  [2017] NSWCCA 279, [146]–[147] (Bellew J). 
47  Dyer (n 45) 99. 
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the honesty of the accused’s asserted belief in consent, as the Supreme 
Court of Canada appears to have acknowledged in R v Barton.48 
Furthermore, in cases of rape where a defendant is suffering from a 
delusional psychotic illness or personality disorder, a delusional belief that 
a victim was consenting cannot be considered a reasonable one. In R v B,49 
there was evidence that B had been suffering from a mental disorder at the 
time of the offences, but he did have the capacity to know that what he was 
doing was wrong. The Court held that the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (UK) 
deliberately does not make a genuine belief in consent enough. The belief 
must not only be genuinely held; it must also be reasonable in all the 
circumstances. A delusional belief in consent, if entertained, would be by 
definition irrational and thus unreasonable, not reasonable. 
Lord Justice Hughes stated: 
We conclude that unless and until the state of mind amounts to insanity in 
law, then under the rule enacted in the Sexual Offences Act beliefs in 
consent arising from conditions such as delusional psychotic illness or 
personality disorders must be judged by objective standards of 
reasonableness and not by taking into account a mental disorder which 
induced a belief which could not reasonably arise without it.50 
The treatment of the offence of rape in the remaining Australian 
jurisdictions is inadequate, especially in the three Griffith Codes, although 
Tasmania in 2004 introduced s 14A Mistake as to consent in certain sexual 
offences, which is discussed in the next section. The Griffith Codes suffer 
the fatal flaw recognised by Dixon CJ, that the central criminal 
responsibility section is expressed in general but negative terms and often 
has little or nothing to say as to the elements of offences.51 Indeed, the 
inadequacy of the Queensland and Western Australia provisions can be 
seen by the interaction between the offence provision for rape (sexual 
intercourse without consent) in s 349(2)(a) in the Criminal Code (Qld)52 
and s 325(1) in the Criminal Code (WA)53 where no fault element is stated, 
                                                        
48  2019 SCC 33 [113]: ‘[A]s a practical matter it is hard to conceive of a situation in which 
reasonable steps would not also constitute reasonable grounds for the purpose of 
assessing the honesty of the accused’s asserted belief.’ The Supreme Court of Canada 
was considering s 273.2(b) of the Criminal Code (Canada) which states: ‘the accused 
did not take reasonable steps, in the circumstances known to the accused at the time, to 
ascertain that the complainant was consenting.’ 
49  [2013] EWCA Crim 3. 
50  R v B [2013] EWCA Crim 3 [40]. 
51  Vallance v The Queen (1961) 108 CLR 56, 59. 
52  Section 349(2)(a): ‘A person rapes another person if — (a) the person has carnal 
knowledge with or of the other person without the other person’s consent.’ 
53  Section 325(1): ‘A person who sexually penetrates another person without the consent 
of that person is guilty of a crime and is liable to imprisonment for 14 years.’ 
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and s 24 Mistake of fact which is identical in both Queensland and Western 
Australia.54 
 The lack of a fault element implies rape is a strict liability offence, with 
only mistake of fact available as a defence. However, from a practical 
perspective, the classification of the offence of rape as one of strict liability 
is artificial as the offence requires lack of consent, and a defendant who 
pleads not guilty is normally pleading that the sexual intercourse was 
consensual. Furthermore, s 24 is a generic section with no particular 
reference to rape or the sexual offences provisions, and contains both a 
subjective element (‘honest’) and an objective element (‘reasonable’). 
Thus, to argue that the Queensland and Western Australia provisions are 
more victim-centric because they are strict liability offences combined with 
a mistake of fact provision that requires the mistaken belief to be honest 
and reasonable, overlooks the need to define the fault element for rape 
(such as reckless indifference). Further, this approach fails to specify the 
limits of mistaken belief in consent where it applies to rape (proceeding 
regardless of the possibility of lack of consent, failure to take reasonable 
steps or not giving any thought as to consent). 
In summary, the Queensland and Western Australia provisions reflect their 
19th century architecture, with no fault element prescribed and a generic 
mistake of fact provision that is the antithesis of victim-centric provisions 
dealing with rape, both in its statutory language and its wide or liberal 
(from the defendant’s perspective) judicial interpretation (see discussion in 
next section). Once the judge allows the defence of mistake of fact to go to 
the jury, then the burden of proof falls on the Crown to show that the 
complainant was not consenting. Hence, it is important that the defence be 
more tightly drawn to encompass what positive steps the defendant took to 
establish the complainant was consenting. The strength of this argument 
would appear to have been accepted by the Queensland government 
following a recent referral of the defence of mistake of fact to the 
Queensland Law Reform Commission.55 
South Australia is a good example of a jurisdiction that has recognised the 
nexus between the fault element for rape and the boundaries of mistake as 
it pertains to lack of consent. Thus, as discussed above, s 48(1) of the 
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) specifies knowledge or 
reckless indifference as the alternative fault elements for rape, while s 47 
specifies three alternative meanings of reckless indifference to the fact that 
the other person does not consent. Under these alternatives, it is hard to 
                                                        
54  Section 24: ‘A person who does or omits to do an act under an honest and reasonable, 
but mistaken, belief in the existence of any state of things is not criminally responsible 
for the act or omission to any greater extent than if the real state of things had been such 
as he believed to exist.’ 
55  See Josh Robertson, ‘Queensland will abolish rape defence ‘loophole’ if law reform 
experts recommend it’ ABC News (online, 10 July 2019) <https://www.abc.net.au/ 
news/2019-07-09/mistake-of-fact-defence-review-queensland/11291856>. 
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understand an interpretation that the SA legislation could be construed as 
exculpating an accused person who has given some thought to the question 
of consent but is unreasonably unaware of the possibility of non-consent. 
Unreasonable unawareness would seem to equate to not giving any thought 
as to consent. In any event, the purpose of s 47 is to make the test for 
mistaken belief as to consent more objective, and to avoid the subjective 
element of ‘honest’ but mistaken belief in s 24 of the Queensland and 
Western Australia Criminal Codes. 
The Australian Capital Territory relies on the fault element of recklessness 
in s 54(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT).56 The definition of recklessness 
follows the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth), but there is no further refinement 
of the definition of recklessness to be found in s 54 of the Crimes Act 1900 
(ACT). This compares unfavourably with s 192(4A) of the Criminal Code 
(NT) and s 47 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA). 
Queensland, Western Australia and Tasmania follow the Griffith Code 
model. As can be seen below, s 185 of the Criminal Code (Tas) specifies 
no fault element. 
Section 185 Rape 
(1) Any person who has sexual intercourse with another person without 
that person's consent is guilty of a crime. 
The same absence of a fault element applies to s 349 of the Criminal Code 
(Qld) and s 325 of the Criminal Code Act Compilation Act (WA), which is 
in keeping with the Griffith Code design, namely, to define offences by 
reference to conduct and circumstances. As Devereux and Blake have 
explained under the Griffith Codes ‘the question becomes, simply: Did the 
victim consent?’57 Bronitt and McSherry have stated that the fault element 
for rape in the Griffith Codes is one of strict liability.58 This follows from 
the victim’s lack of consent forming part of the actus reus or physical 
element, while the defendant’s belief that the victim was consenting is the 
essence of the only defence to a strict liability offence, namely, mistake of 
fact. 
B Mistake of Fact 
At the outset of this section, it should be remembered that the defence of 
mistake of fact must satisfy the evidential onus of a reasonable possibility 
                                                        
56  Section 54(3) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) states: ‘For this section, proof of knowledge 
or recklessness is sufficient to establish the element of recklessness.’ 
57  John Devereux and Meredith Blake, Kenny Criminal Law in Queensland and Western 
Australia (LexisNexis, 9th ed, 2016) 341 [14.26]. 
58  Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (Thomson Reuters, 
4th ed, 2017) tbl 1 649 [11.35]. 
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that the matter exists or does not exist.59 In R v Barton,60 the Supreme 
Court of Canada pointed out that the availability of the defence of honest 
but mistaken belief in communicated consent was not unlimited. 
An accused who wishes to rely on the defence of honest but mistaken belief 
in communicated consent must first demonstrate that there is an air of 
reality to the defence. This necessarily requires that the trial judge consider 
whether there is any evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact acting 
judicially could find (1) that the accused took reasonable steps to ascertain 
consent and (2) that the accused honestly believed the complainant 
communicated consent. This Court recently confirmed that where there is 
no evidence upon which the trier of fact could find that the accused took 
reasonable steps to ascertain consent, the defence of honest but mistaken 
belief in communicated consent must not be left with the jury (see R v 
Gagnon 2018 SCC 41).61 
Section 61HE(3)(c) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) discussed above opens 
up the possibility of adding the fault element of ‘no reasonable grounds for 
believing’ the other person was consenting to the baseline position 
previously identified of knowledge and ‘reckless indifference’ contained 
in s 47 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA). The use of the 
word ‘reasonable’ imports an objective test. The term ‘no reasonable 
belief’ is also to be found in s 38(1)(c) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). 
Section 38 Rape 
(1) A person (A) commits an offence if — 
(a) A intentionally62 sexually penetrates another person (B); and 
(b) B does not consent to the penetration; and 
(c) A does not reasonably believe that B consents to the penetration. 
Reasonable belief in consent is defined in s 36A of the Crimes Act 1958 
(Vic). Section 36A(2) refers to any steps the person has taken to establish 
if the other person is consenting. This mirrors and supplements the further 
refinement of the meaning of ‘recklessness’ in s 192(4A) of the Criminal 
Code (NT) to include not giving any thought to whether or not the other 
person is consenting. 
 
                                                        
59  See, for example, Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) s 13.3(6). 
60  2019 SCC 33. 
61  Ibid [121]. 
62  A’s intention to sexually penetrate another person (B) is usually not in dispute. The issue 
is one of consent and whether A had a reasonable belief B was consenting. Victoria has 
chosen not follow the Model Criminal Code in specifying knowledge and recklessness 
as the fault elements for rape, but instead has sought to minimise the reach of mistake of 
fact through an objective test. 
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Section 36A Reasonable belief in consent 
(1) Whether or not a person reasonably believes that another person is 
consenting to an act depends on the circumstances. 
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), the circumstances include any steps 
that the person has taken to find out whether the other person consents. 
Thus, s 36A of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) has the effect of replacing the 
excuse of mistake of fact (doing an act under an honest and reasonable, but 
mistaken, belief) for the purpose of establishing whether or not the other 
person was consenting to sexual intercourse.63 
In 2004, s 14A, which deals with mistake as to consent in certain sexual 
offences was inserted into the Criminal Code (Tas). It can be seen that the 
effect of s 14A(1) is to nullify honest and reasonable mistake under three 
circumstances: intoxication, recklessness as to consent, and not taking 
reasonable steps to establish consent. Intoxication is discussed in the next 
section, but unfortunately recklessness is not defined in s 1 Interpretation, 
and the term ‘reasonable steps in the circumstances known to him or her at 
the time’ is left open to judicial interpretation. 
14A Mistake as to consent in certain sexual offences 
(1) In proceedings for an offence against section 124 [sexual intercourse 
with a young person], 125B [indecent act with young person], 127 
[indecent assault] or 185 [rape], a mistaken belief by the accused as to 
the existence of consent is not honest or reasonable if the accused — 
(a) was in a state of self-induced intoxication and the mistake was not 
one which the accused would have made if not intoxicated;64 or 
(b) was reckless as to whether or not the complainant consented; or 
(c) did not take reasonable steps, in the circumstances known to him 
or her at the time of the offence, to ascertain that the complainant 
was consenting to the act. 
Notwithstanding the limitations of s 14A(1), it can be respectfully stated 
that it is a marked improvement on s 24 Mistake of fact in the other two 
                                                        
63  The jury directions on ‘reasonable belief’ are contained in s 47 Direction on reasonable 
belief in consent of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic). Under s 47(1), the prosecution 
or defence counsel may request that the trial judge direct the jury on reasonable belief in 
consent. One of the directions open to the trial judge is contained in s 47(3)(b)(i): direct 
the jury that in determining whether the accused who was intoxicated had a reasonable 
belief at any time — (i) if the intoxication was self-induced, regard must be had to the 
standard of a reasonable person who is not intoxicated and who is otherwise in the same 
circumstances as the accused at the relevant time. 
64 The Tasmanian approach is to focus on the relevance of evidence of intoxication as it 
relates to a claim of mistaken belief as to the existence of consent, as opposed to the 
relevance of evidence of intoxication as it relates to the mental element (mens rea). 
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Griffith Codes of Queensland and Western Australia.65 Section 24(1) 
states: 
(1) A person who does or omits to do an act under an honest and 
reasonable, but mistaken, belief in the existence of any state of things 
is not criminally responsible for the act or omission to any greater 
extent than if the real state of things had been such as the person 
believed to exist. 
Section 24(1) above contains both a subjective (honest) and objective 
(reasonable) test for mistake of fact. The inclusion of the word ‘reasonable’ 
at least avoids the wholly subjective common law test set out in Director 
of Public Prosecutions v Morgan66 whereby the honest belief that the 
complainant was consenting can be unreasonable.67 On one view, the 
decision in Morgan was concerned with the common law requirements of 
mens rea as regards the genuineness of the belief in consent; while another 
view posits that if the accused has an honest and reasonable but mistaken 
belief in circumstances that, if they existed, would have rendered his or her 
act non-criminal, he or she does in fact lack mens rea.68 In any event, as 
Crowe has pointed out,69 in a series of cases the Queensland Court of 
Appeal has given a wide or liberal (to the defendant) interpretation of the 
meaning of s 24 in rape trials: see R v Parsons,70 R v Mrzljak,71 R v 
Kovacs,72 R v Dunrobin,73 and Phillips v The Queen.74 
                                                        
65  See Jonathan Crowe, ‘Consent, Power and Mistake of Fact in Queensland Rape Law’ 
(2011) 23(1) Bond Law Review 21, where the author argues that s 14A(1) provides a 
model for Queensland. More recently, see Jonathon Crowe, ‘Consent is not a ‘romance 
killer’: the mistake of fact defence needs to go’ The Guardian (online, 8 January 2019)  
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jan/08/consent-is-not-a-romance-
killer-the-mistake-of-fact-defence-for-needs-to-go>. See also Josh Robertson, 
‘Queensland rape laws ‘a hangover from old attitudes’, former judge says’ ABC News 
(online, 20 March 2019) <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-20/sexual-consent-
laws-queensland/10905688>. 
66  [1976] AC 182. 
67  The decision in DPP v Morgan has been statutorily overruled by virtue of s 1(c) of the 
Sexual Offences Act 2003 (UK) which states: ‘A person (A) commits an offence if — 
(c) A does not reasonably believe that B consents. 
68  Bank of New South Wales v Piper [1897] AC 383, 389–90, where the Judicial Committee 
stated: ‘the absence of mens rea really consists in an honest and reasonable belief 
entertained by the accused of the existence of facts which, if true, would make the act 
charged against him innocent.’ As Brennan J pointed out in He Kaw Teh v The Queen 
(1985) 157 CLR 523, 572–3, referring to Bank of NSW v Piper: ‘This was the view also 
of Sir Samuel Griffith who, when he submitted his draft Criminal Code, stated the 
common law to be the source of the provision drafted as s 26 and enacted as s 24 of the 
Criminal Code (Q).’ 
69  Crowe, ‘Consent, Power and Mistake of Fact in Queensland Rape Law’ (n 65) 34–7. 
70  [2001] 1 Qd R 655. 
71  [2005] Qd R 308. 
72  [2007] QCA 143. 
73  [2008] QCA 116. 
74  [2009] QCA 57. 
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In R v Kovacs,75 the defence case was that consensual sexual intercourse 
had taken place in exchange for payment. The trial judge stated there was 
no evidence to support the defence proposition. McMurdo P and Holmes 
JA, at [25], held that this misstatement of evidence meant the judge did not 
fairly put the defence case before the jury as it directly concerned a limb of 
the defence case (honest and reasonable belief the complainant was 
consenting for payment). 
In R v Dunrobin,76 the complainant’s evidence was that she had physically 
resisted the appellant and consistently told him to stop, although at some 
point she admitted she had frozen because she was scared. Muir JA (with 
whom Fryberg and Lyons JJ agreed) held, at [32], the trial judge’s direction 
to the jury on s 24 was deficient in stating acceptance of the complainant’s 
evidence meant it was unlikely that the defendant thought she was 
consenting: ‘Relevant to that defence was the appellant’s state of mind and 
what was said and done at relevant times which bore on the existence or 
non-existence of that state of mind.’ 
In Phillips v The Queen,77 the appellant was tried on four counts of rape of 
a thirteen year old girl. The Court of Appeal was troubled by the apparent 
inconsistency in the verdicts. Holmes JA gave the leading judgment and 
focused, at [29], on the trial judge’s decision to rule out mistake of fact for 
counts 1 and 3 where the complainant (K) had specifically said she tried to 
push the appellant away, and only directing the jury on s 24 on counts 2 
and 4. The jury acquitted the appellant of rape in respect of counts 1 and 3, 
returning instead verdicts of guilt of carnal knowledge on those counts. On 
count 4, however, on which the mistake of fact direction had been given, 
the jury returned a verdict of rape. 
This led Holmes JA, at [34], to conclude that the verdict on count 4 was 
unreasonable and to therefore substitute a verdict of guilt of carnal 
knowledge on count 4. 
The evidence could not explain a conclusion that the Crown had both 
established the lack of consent and ruled out the possibility of mistake so 
as to lead to conviction on count 4, while failing to do so in relation to 
counts 1 and 3, so as to lead to acquittals on those counts. 
The conclusion to be drawn from the above cases on s 24 is that Queensland 
Court of Appeal will accept the evidence most favourable to the defendant 
(such as sex for payment); applies a subjective test to s 24 (defendant’s 
state of mind); and adopts a low bar in leaving s 24 with the jury (such as 
with multiple counts). 
                                                        
75  [2007] QCA 143. 
76  [2008] QCA 116. 
77  [2009] QCA 57. 
In Search of a Model Provision for Rape in Australia  95 
The difficulties in the application of the operation of s 24(1) Mistake of 
fact identified in the five Queensland cases above can be addressed in three 
ways: (1) inserting a specific provision for mistake as to consent in certain 
sexual offences akin to s 14A of the Criminal Code (Tas); (2) defining the 
term ‘recklessness’; and (3) giving examples of taking reasonable steps to 
ascertain whether or not the complainant was consenting to the act. Section 
14A(1)(a) above states that a mistaken belief by the accused as to the 
existence of consent is not honest or reasonable if the accused  was in a 
state of self-induced intoxication and the mistake was not one which the 
accused would have made if not intoxicated. Given the importance of 
dealing with the issue of intoxication in a model rape provision, it is timely 
to turn to the treatment of intoxication. 
C Intoxication 
As the person is often intoxicated at the time of the alleged offence, s 
36B(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) deals with the effect of self-induced 
intoxication on reasonable belief.78 The test is objective in that the standard 
to be applied is that of a reasonable person who is not intoxicated. 
Section 36B Effect of intoxication on reasonable belief 
(1) In determining whether a person who is intoxicated has a reasonable 
belief at any time — 
(a) if the intoxication is self-induced, regard must be had to the 
standard of a reasonable person who is not intoxicated and who is 
otherwise in the same circumstances as that person at the relevant 
time. 
The treatment of intoxication and its effect on reasonable belief in s 
36B(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) is preferable to the treatment of 
intoxication as regards sexual offences in New South Wales. New South 
Wales follows DPP v Majewski79 in distinguishing between crimes of 
specific and basic intent.80 Crimes of specific intent are set out in s 428B 
of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), and only s 61K which covers assault with 
intent to have sexual intercourse is listed in s 428B. This follows from rape 
                                                        
78  The Victorian approach is to focus on the relevance of evidence of intoxication as it 
relates to the mental element (mens rea), as opposed to the relevance of evidence of 
intoxication as it relates to a claim of mistaken belief as to the existence of consent.  
79  [1977] AC 443. See also Queensland, where s 28(3) of the Criminal Code (Qld) states: 
‘When an intention to cause a specific result is an element of an offence, intoxication, 
whether complete or partial, and whether intentional or unintentional, may be regarded 
for the purpose of ascertaining whether such an intention in fact existed.’ 
80  An offence of basic intent is one where the defendant intends to commit the proscribed 
conduct such as to strike the victim in a case of common assault. For an offence of 
specific intent some further intention is required such as not only intending to strike the 
victim but also intending to cause the victim serious harm in a case of causing serious 
harm. 
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being a crime of basic intent,81 and s 61HE(3)(e) of the Crimes Act 1900 
(NSW) which excludes any consideration of self-induced intoxication of 
the person from a finding of knowledge about consent. However, greater 
clarity is provided by abandoning the distinction between crimes of basic 
and specific intent for rape,82 and adopting the Victorian objective standard 
of a reasonable person who is not intoxicated, which is very similar in 
purpose to s 14A(1)(a) of the Criminal Code (Tas). 
By the same token, the convoluted treatment of intoxication under the 
Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) is also best avoided.83 By virtue of s 8.2, the 
Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) has, on the surface, opted for the Majewski 
model of distinguishing between offences of specific and basic intent. 
However, the Commonwealth Criminal Code’s Guide to Practitioners 
states that ‘specific intent has no counterpart in Chapter 2 and basic intent 
is given a restricted definition’ such that Majewski is ‘of little or no use in 
determining the application of the Code provisions’.84 
Section 8.2(1) of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) states that evidence of self-
induced intoxication cannot be considered in determining whether a fault 
element of basic intent existed. However, s 8.2(1) is qualified by a note that 
states that ‘a fault element of intention with respect to a circumstance or 
with respect to a result is not a fault element of basic intent’, and by 
subsections which allow self-induced intoxication to be taken into 
consideration in determining whether the conduct was accidental (s 8.2(3)) 
or whether the person had a mistaken belief about facts (s 8.2(4)). As 
Odgers has pointed out, the prohibition on the use of evidence of voluntary 
intoxication has no application in determining whether a fault element 
existed in relation to ‘a physical element of circumstance or a physical 
element of result; an ulterior (or specific) intention; or knowledge, 
recklessness or negligence’.85 It is contended that the note and the two 
exceptions have the effect of making the prohibition in s 8.2(1) virtually 
meaningless. 
                                                        
81  See R v Woods (1982) 74 Cr App R 312. 
82  In Tasmania, ‘since the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1998 in Weiderman 
(Attorney-General’s Reference No 1 of 1996) (1998) 7 Tas R 293, the accused may also 
rely upon intoxication to explain absence of knowledge as to consequences or 
circumstances but not imputed knowledge’: Rebecca Bradfield, Kate Warner and Jenny 
Rudolf, Tasmanian Law Reform Institute, Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility, 
(Final Report No 7, August 2006) 5. 
83  For a fuller discussion of the limitations of the treatment of intoxication in the Criminal 
Code 1995 (Cth), see Andrew Hemming, ‘Banishing Evidence of Intoxication in 
Determining Whether a Defendant Acted Voluntarily and Intentionally’ (2010) 29(1) 
The University of Tasmania Law Review 1. 
84  Ian Leader-Elliott for the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, The 
Commonwealth Criminal Code — A Guide for Practitioners (2002) 145. 
85  Stephen Odgers, Principles of Federal Criminal Law (Thomson Reuters, 4th ed, 2019) 
[8.2.100] 103. 
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Finally, on the question of treatment of intoxication in a rape case, it is 
unclear why South Australia has, by virtue of s 268(3)(a) of the Criminal 
Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), elected to leave intoxication as a 
potential defence in a case in which it is necessary to establish that 
the defendant foresaw the consequences of his or her conduct. In other 
words, s 268(2), which otherwise presumes the mental element if the 
objective elements of an alleged offence are established against an 
intoxicated defendant and if the defendant would, if his or her conduct had 
been voluntary and intended, have been guilty of the offence, does not 
apply in a case where awareness (knowledge) is an element of the offence. 
The exception to the operation of s 268(3)(a) is the offence of rape by virtue 
of s 268(3)(b). Such an exception is necessary because the Crown, in order 
to secure a conviction for rape, has to establish the defendant was aware of 
the circumstances surrounding his or her conduct under s 48(1) of the 
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA). This seems a cumbersome 
approach, and it is contended that the Victorian objective standard of a 
reasonable person who is not intoxicated is the better solution. 
268 — Mental element of offence to be presumed in certain cases  
(1) If the objective elements of an alleged offence are established against 
a defendant but the defendant's consciousness was (or may have been) 
impaired by intoxication to the point of criminal irresponsibility at the 
time of the alleged offence, the defendant is nevertheless to be 
convicted of the offence if it is established that the defendant —  
(a) formed an intention to commit the offence before becoming 
intoxicated; and  
(b) consumed intoxicants in order to strengthen his or her resolve to 
commit the offence.  
(2) If the objective elements of an alleged offence are established against 
a defendant but the defendant's consciousness was (or may have been) 
impaired by self-induced intoxication to the point of criminal 
irresponsibility at the time of the alleged offence, the defendant is 
nevertheless to be convicted of the offence if the defendant would, if 
his or her conduct had been voluntary and intended, have been guilty 
of the offence.  
(3) However, subsection (2) does not extend to —  
(a) a case in which it is necessary to establish that 
the defendant foresaw the consequences of his or her conduct; or  
(b) except where the alleged offence is an offence against section 48 
(rape) — a case in which it is necessary to establish that 
the defendant was aware of the circumstances surrounding his or 
her conduct.  
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IV THE MODEL PROVISION FOR RAPE 
The preferred position for the definitions and elements of the crime of rape 
(sexual intercourse without consent) can be summed up in the following 
terms: 
1. The starting point for the design of a comprehensive list of factors 
which vitiate consent for sexual offences is s 36(2) of the Crimes Act 
1958 (Vic). 
2. Specification of the alternative fault elements of knowledge, as defined 
in s 5.3 Knowledge of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth), and ‘reckless 
indifference’ as defined in s 47 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 
1935 (SA). 
3. The addition of a third alternative fault element in the form of no 
reasonable grounds for believing the other person was consenting, as 
found in s 61HE(3)(c) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). 
4. Reasonable belief in consent to depend on all the circumstances and to 
include any reasonable physical or verbal steps that the person has 
taken to find out whether the other person consents, modified from s 
36A of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). 
5. The effect of self-induced intoxication on reasonable belief to be 
determined by the objective standard of a reasonable person who is not 
intoxicated, as found in s 36B(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). 
This preferred position can now be set out as a model provision for rape 
(or the equivalent offence). 
(1) Consent means free and voluntary agreement. 
(2) Circumstances in which a person does not consent to an act include, 
but are not limited to,86 the following—  
(a) the person submits to the act because of force or the fear of force, 
whether to that person or someone else;  
(b) the person submits to the act because of the fear of harm of any 
type,87 whether to that person or someone else or an animal;  
                                                        
86  The list of vitiating factors is non-exhaustive to allow some degree of judicial discretion 
where a circumstance not previously considered by the legislature arises in the future. 
However, it would then be for the legislature to amend the list accordingly provided it 
supports the case law. 
87  The fear of harm of any type covers non-violent threats, but for clarity sub-section (c) 
covers intimidatory or coercive conduct, or other threat, that does not involve a threat of 
force, which is taken from s 61HE(8)(b) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). 
In Search of a Model Provision for Rape in Australia  99 
(c) the person submits to the act because of intimidatory or 
coercive conduct, or other threat, that does not involve a threat of 
force; 
(d) the person submits to the act because of the abuse of a position of 
authority or trust;88 
(e) the person submits to the act because the person is unlawfully 
detained;  
(f) the person is asleep or unconscious;  
(g) the person is so affected by alcohol or another drug as to be 
incapable of consenting to the act;  
(h) the person is so affected by alcohol or another drug as to be 
incapable of withdrawing consent to the act; 
Note 
This circumstance may apply where a person gave consent when 
not so affected by alcohol or another drug as to be incapable of 
consenting. 
(i) the person is incapable of understanding the sexual nature of the 
act;  
(j) the person is mistaken about the sexual nature of the act;  
(k) the person is mistaken about the identity of any other person 
involved in the act;  
(l) the person mistakenly believes that the act is for medical or 
hygienic purposes;  
Example   
A person is taken not to freely and voluntarily agree to sexual 
activity if the person agrees to engage in the activity under the 
mistaken belief that the activity is necessary for the purpose of 
medical diagnosis, investigation or treatment, or for the purpose 
of hygiene.  
(m) if the act involves an animal, the person mistakenly believes that 
the act is for veterinary, agricultural or scientific research 
purposes;  
(n) the person does not say or do anything to indicate consent to the 
act;  
Example 
                                                        
88  Taken from s 61HE(8)(c) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). 
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The person may be so afraid as to freeze and not do or say 
anything. 
(o) having initially given consent to the act, the person later 
withdraws consent to the act taking place or continuing;  
Example 
Where a person has given consent to an act, the person may 
withdraw that consent either before the act takes place or at any 
time while the act is taking place. 
(p) the person gave conditional consent to the act provided the other 
person wore a condom or withdrew his penis before ejaculating 
and the condition was not met; 
(q) the person agrees or submits to the act because of the fraud or 
misrepresentation of the accused. 
Note 
Frauds or misrepresentations, as a vitiating circumstance to 
consent, are confined to a full comprehension of the nature and 
purpose of the act and the identity of the person, consistent with 
ss (j) and (k) above, and specifically exclude a deception 
involving infidelity, wealth, marital status, intention to marry, and 
intention to pay a sex worker. 
(3) A person is guilty of rape if the person has sexual intercourse with 
another person: 
(a) without the other person's consent; and 
(b) knowing about the lack of consent, or being recklessly indifferent 
as to the lack of consent, or having no reasonable grounds for 
believing the other person was consenting. 
For the purpose of this sub-section, the following definitions 
apply: 
Knowledge: A person has knowledge of a result or circumstance 
if the person is aware that it exists or will exist in the ordinary 
course of events. 
Recklessly indifferent: a person is recklessly indifferent to the fact 
that another person does not consent to an act, or has withdrawn 
consent to an act, if he or she — 
a. is aware of the possibility that the other person might not 
be consenting to the act, or has withdrawn consent to the 
In Search of a Model Provision for Rape in Australia  101 
act, but decides to proceed regardless of that possibility;89 
or  
b. is aware of the possibility that the other person might not 
be consenting to the act, or has withdrawn consent to the 
act, but fails to take reasonable steps to ascertain whether 
the other person does in fact consent, or has in fact 
withdrawn consent, to the act before deciding to 
proceed;90 or  
c. does not give any thought as to whether or not the other 
person is consenting to the act, or has withdrawn consent 
to the act before deciding to proceed.  
(4) For the purpose of sub-section (3)(b), reasonable belief in consent 
depends on the circumstances known to a person at the time and 
includes any reasonable physical or verbal steps a person has taken to 
ascertain whether the other person is consenting. 
Example  
Where a person forms a belief about consent in ambiguous 
circumstances, such as where the other person is very tired or 
adversely affected by alcohol, without taking reasonable physical or 
verbal steps to determine if the other person consents. 
Standard 
At a minimum, it will be reasonable for the defendant to take at least 
some physical or verbal steps to find out whether the other person is 
consenting. 
(5) In determining whether a person who is intoxicated is aware of the 
possibility that the other person might not be consenting to the act, or 
has withdrawn consent to the act, or has a reasonable belief at any time, 
if the intoxication is self-induced, regard must be had to the standard 
of a reasonable person who is not intoxicated and who is otherwise in 
the same circumstances as that person at the relevant time. 
V CONCLUSION 
The justification for such a broad model provision for the offence of rape 
(sexual intercourse without consent) is: (1) comprehensiveness; (2) clarity; 
(3) consistency; and (4) maximising the reach of criminal responsibility for 
rape by the inclusion of objective tests. These objective tests are found in 
the definition of the fault element of ‘recklessly indifferent’; in the 
reasonable steps test to ascertain whether the other person is consenting, 
                                                        
89  Under option (a), the person would always have failed the ‘reasonable steps’ test, and 
where applicable this option would be preferred by the Crown ahead of option (b). 
90  Option (b) presents the greatest difficulty for the Crown where the defendant claims to 
have taken some positive step to ascertain consent. The primary point of contention 
between the parties will be whether the positive steps were reasonable. 
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thereby minimising the reach of the ‘defence’ of mistake of fact; and in the 
standard of the reasonable person who is not intoxicated, thereby 
minimising the reach of the ‘defence’ of intoxication. The overall purpose 
is to make the test of mistaken belief in consent more objective and less 
subjective, as well as to make the process of adjudging guilt for rape more 
objective. It is contended that this model provision can be readily adapted 
to all Australian jurisdictions by virtue of the definitions contained within 
the provision, and demonstrates that it is possible to reform key criminal 
offences in a uniform manner which may also reduce some of the well-
known difficulties in securing a conviction for rape.  
